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POLISHING UP THE LANGUAGE OF A
SEDITION STATUTE:
THE SMITH ACT, NIXON'S "SMITH ACT,"
AND THE "SMITH ACT"
IN THE McCLELLAN-HRUSKA CRIMINAL
CODE BILL
by David Randall Luce*
"From Korea to Berlin to Cuba to Vietnam, the Truman Doctrine
governed America's response to the Communist world," Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright could say with the
wisdom of hindsight.1 "Sustained by an inert Congress," he continued,
"the policymakers of the forties, fifties, and early sixties were never
compelled to reexamine the premises of the Truman Doctrine, or even
to defend them in constructive adversary proceedings .... Change
has come not from wisdom but from disaster."2 Senator Fulbright went
on to characterize the temper of the times as he viewed them in retro-
spect, stating that "the assumptions of the Cold War were all but un-
challenged." 3
Operating on a set of assumptions that defined reality for them-that
as a social system Communism was deeply immoral, that as a political
movement it was a conspiracy for world conquest--our leaders became
liberated from the normal rules of evidence and inference when it came
to dealing with Communism.
The effect of the anti-Communist ideology was to spare us the task
of taking cognizance of the specific facts of specific situations. Our
"faith" liberated us, like the believers of old, from the requirements of
empirical thinking, from the necessity of observing and evaluating the
actual behavior of the nations and leaders with whom we are dealing.
Like medieval theologians, we had a philosophy that explained every-
thing to us in advance, and everything that did not fit could be readily
identified as a fraud or a lie or an illusion.'
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
1. Fulbright, Reflections: In Thrall to Fear, Tan Nuw Yolmi_, Jan. 8, 1972, at 41.
2. Id. at 42.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 42-43.
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"Never compelled to reexamine the premises," never compelled "to
defend them in constructive adversary proceedings"-the words re-
mind us of the second chapter of On Liberty.5 It was there that John
Stuart Mill attempted to ground an absolute principle of freedom of
speech upon considerations of utility alone. Freedom of speech is good,
and suppression is bad, because only when assumptions are tested by
vigorous dissent can we have any reasonable assurance that they are
true. Whatever inconsistencies we attribute to Mill, whatever the
shortcomings of the utilitarian argument, the tragedy of Vietnam
obliges us to acknowledge that very real and very terrible consequences
may flow from the absence of dissent, from the too casual acceptance
of the conventional wisdom, and from the dismissal of certain points
of view as beyond the pale of respectability. We did not honor "the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, ' and we suffered for it.
Why were the premises never reexamined? Why was there no
political force sufficient to compel the "Cold Warriors" to defend their
premises in constructive adversary proceedings? We can, I think,
identify some of the causes. We can point to the loyalty-security
program for federal employees,7 given a new direction by Executive
Order 98358;8 the Attorney General's list of "subversive organiza-
tions," one product of that Executive Order;9 the sensational hearings
conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities;10 the
many well-publicized trials involving charges of perjury, disloyalty,
treason, and espionage;11 section 9(h) of the Labor Management
5. J.S. MILL, ON LmiRTY (1859). Chapter II bears the title Of the Liberty of
Thought and Discussion.
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
7. Executive Order 9300, 3 C.F.R. 1252 (Comp. 1938-1943).
8. 3 C.F.R. 627 (Comp. 1943-1948). For an extended discussion of the federal
loyalty-security program see 1 T. EMERSON, D. HADER & N. DOESEN, PoLcAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTs iN THE UNmTED STATES 340 et seq. (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN].
9. See EmERsoN, HABER & DoRsEN, supra note 8, at 385-88.
10. See TiRTY YEARS OF TREASON: EXCERPTE FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE HousE
CoMnMTIr-T ON UN-AMERicAN Acrvrrms 1938-1968 (E. Bentley, ed. 1971). See also
R. CARE, Tm HOUSE CoMMrrrEE ON UN-AMERICAN Acnvres 1945-1950 (1952);
EmEasON, HABER & DoRsEN, supra note 8, at 426-31; G. MUN, HOLLYWOOD ON TRIAL
(1948); C. McWmLrAMs, WrrcH HUNr: THm REvivAL OF HERESY (1950).
11. See, e.g., Remington v. United States, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 913 (1954); Rosenberg v. United States, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 838 (1952); Coplan v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert.
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Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act, the non-Communist affidavit
provision), 2 the Internal Security Act of 1950 (McCarran Act),13 the
Communist Control Act of 1954,1" and similar legislation enacted by
the states;'5 and numerous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, which found none of the foregoing incompatible with the first
amendment.' 6
I think it safe to characterize these programs and institutions as a
two-edged sword, positively shaping public opinion in a definite direc-
tion while at the same time rendering any dissent exceedingly risky,
quite costly in human terms, and unlikely to gain a hearing or to be
effective when heard. Thus it was that the premises of the Cold War
went largely unexamined and unchallenged. And as Senator Ful-
bright reminded us, we paid a price for it.
Among the causes operative in creating the Cold War mentality we
must list the indictments of 141 American Communist Party leaders
under the Smith Act.' 7  The first indictments came down in July, 1948,
denied, 343 U.S. 926 (1952); United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951).
For materials on the Rosenberg trial see W. & M. SciNEIa, INViTATION TO INQUEST:
A NEW LOOK AT TnE ROSENBERG-SOBELL CASE (1968); M. SHAi', WAS JUSTICE DONE?
THE ROSENBERG-SOBELL CASE (1956); J. WXL=EY, THE JUDGMENT OF JULIUS Am ETHEL
ROSENBm (1955); on the Hiss trial see F. Coot, THE UNFinSImi- STORY OF ALGER
Hiss (1958); A. CoOKE, A GENERATION ON TRIAL: U.S.A. v. ALGER Hiss (1950); A.
Hiss, IN THE COURT OF PuBLic OPINION (1957).
For general surveys on the "McCarthy Era" see J. ARONSON, TiE PRESS AND THE
COLD WAR (1970); C. BELFAGis, THE AmERICAN INQUISITION 1954-1960 (1973); C.
McWILLIAMS, WITCH HUNT: THE REVIVAL OF HERESY (1950).
12. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146. See
EmRSON, HABER & DORSEN, supra note 8, at 229-62.
13. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987.
14. Communist Control Act of 1954, ch. 886, 68 Stat. 775.
15. For a compilation of state sedition and anti-Communist legislation see Am. L.
Div., LEois. REFERENCE SEBvIcE LiB. OF CONG., INTERNAL SECURriY AND SUBVERSION:
A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
Ta INTERNAL SECURIY AcT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE (1965).
16. See, e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). For a study
of the politics of the anti-Communist legislation of the fifties and the role of the Supreme
Court see Wilkinson, The Era of Libertarian Repression 1948-1973: From Congressman
to President, with Substantial Support from the Liberal Establishment, 7 AKRON L. Rlv.
280 (1974).
17. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (now 18 U.S.C. § 2385
(1970)).
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in the midst of a presidential campaign; the last indictment was
dropped in 1964. Prosecutions, vigorously pursued in over a dozen
cities, had the effect of immobilizing the one organization with a vested
interest in opposing the tenor of the times. And the substantial prison
terms eventually served by 29 defendants became proof enough,
according to the logic then current, of the wickedness of Communism."8
In those days it was only the radical few who ventured to suggest
that the United States Government had anything other than the best
intentions. Now, with Vietnam and Watergate behind us, we may have
a more detached view, and recognize the occasional dominance of
shabby political motives in the conduct of Presidents and their Attor-
neys General. The language of the Smith Act readily lent itself to
political abuse-indeed, it provided a positive temptation. We can
therefore avoid the risk of impugning the character of any President
or his Attorney General by focusing our attention on the instrument-
the language of the Smith Act itself.'9
Taking the words at face value, the first paragraph penalizes the
advocacy of revolutionary doctrine. The effect of the second paragraph
is to penalize revolutionary intent rather than conduct, since any book-
seller with Karl Marx or Thomas Jefferson on his shelves would be
engaging in the proscribed conduct. The third paragraph penalizes the
organization of a group or association with a group which advocates
revolutionary doctrine. The fifth penalizes conspiracy to commit any
of the foregoing. If we assume that advocating violence is one step
removed from actual violence, that advocating the propriety of violence
and organizing a group to advocate violence are each two steps re-
moved, and that conspiring with others to organize such a group is three
steps removed, we can see that the Smith Act attaches very stiff penal-
ties to conduct far removed from the actual overthrow of government
by force and violence. Hence its usefulness as a political instrument.
We may no longer take the words at face value, however, by virtue
of Yates v. United States,20 in which the Supreme Court distinguished
between the advocacy of an abstract doctrine and the advocacy of ac-
tion, found the former within the area protected by the first amend-
ment, and construed the Smith Act as penalizing only the latter.
With the exception of one person (Junius Scales), no one went to
prison under the Smith Act after the Court delivered its opinion in
18. For a survey of the Smith Act prosecution see EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN,
supra note 8, at 104-57.
19. The full text of the Smith Act appears as APPENWIx 1.
20. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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Yates. The Yates decision therefore stands as the first effective
obstacle placed in the way of prosecutions under a sedition statute.
Previously, the Supreme Court had upheld a World War I federal
sedition statute,21 the New York sedition statute upon which the Smith
Act was modeled, 2 California's Criminal Syndicalism Act,2" axid the
Smith Act itself.24 In De Jonge v. Oregon,2' the Court reversed a con-
viction brought under Oregon's Criminal Syndicalism Law, but without
challenging the law itself. The Yates decision, again without challeng-
ing the constitutionality of sedition statutes in general, restricted their
scope to the degree that prosecutions under them were no longer feasi-
ble. Yates thus marks a watershed.
The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws took
cognizance of the Yates decision, and also of the "clear and present
danger" principle, 26 in its reformulation of the Smith Act.2 7  Created
by an act of Congress in 1966,28 charged with the task of making a
thorough review of federal criminal law and formulating recommenda-
tions for revision and recodlification, the Commission published a Study
Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code in 197029 and submitted its final
report in 1971.30
I call attention to the following features of the Commission's
reformulation of the Smith Act, paragraph (3):
21. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
22. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
23. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
24. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
25. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
26. Justice Holmes stated:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
27. TnE NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRmIINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFr
OF A NEw FEDERAL CRimImAL CoDE 74 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CoMM'N].
28. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. 89-801, §§ 1-10, 80 Stat. 1516.
29. NATiONAL COmM'N, supra note 27.
30. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The final recommendation of
the Commission has twice been introduced as legislation in the House of Representatives:
in the 93d Congress, as H.R. 10047 (Kastenmeier and Edwards), and in the 94th Con-
gress, as H.R. 333 (Kastenmeier, Edwards, Eilberg and Mikva). The Study Draft con-
tains two sections under chapter 11, National Security, which relate to sedition and the
forcible overthrow of government: section 1103, "Armed Insurrection" (replacing 18
U.S.C. §§ 2383-84 (1970)), and section 1104, "Advocating Armed Insurrection" (re-
placing the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970)). In the final report, the two sections
are brought together under one heading, § 1103, "Armed Insurrection," without further
change. Section 1103 of the Commission's final report appears as APPENDix 2.
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-The conduct which is the target of the proposed legislation is
armed insurrection, conduct much more specific and identifiable than
"overthrowing the government by force or violence." Mere advocacy
of revolution, even violent revolution, is not covered.
-The words "duty" and "propriety" are omitted from the phrase
"duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing" that appears
in the first paragraph of the original Smith Act. A philosopher is acutely
sensitive to the fact that in allowing that in some extraordinary but
nonetheless conceivable circumstances, the violent overthrow of gov-
ernment might be morally permissible, or might even be a moral duty,
he becomes liable under the Smith Act. The Commission's rewording
eliminates the liability that could arise from such propriety or duty.
-The Commission's version requires an element of specific intent.
Whereas the original Smith Act requires only that one "knowingly or
willfully" advocate, the Commission's version requires that one have the
intent "to induce or otherwise cause others to engage in armed
insurrection."
-Advocacy is proscribed only under circumstances in which there
is "substantial likelihood" that the advocacy will, "imminently produce"
actions which constitute engaging in or leading armed insurrection.
The "clear and present danger" criterion receives a statutory formula-
tion for the first time: there must be real and close causal connections
between the advocacy and the action.
-Mere membership in or affiliation with a group engaging in the
proscribed advocacy is not sufficient to make one liable.
The Smith Act prosecutions of the fifties would have been impos-
sible under the language of the Commission's proposal. Indeed, the
advocacy proscribed in paragraph (3) of the Commission's proposal is
so narrowly defined that one may wonder what sort of conduct it covers
that would not also be covered by paragraph (2), "Leading Armed
Insurrection".
The virtues of the Commission's reformulation of the Smith Act are
not limited to the language of paragraph (3). Paragraph (4) greatly
restricts the possibilities of prosecuting someone for attempting to advo-
cate, conspiring with others to advocate, facilitating advocacy, or solicit-
ing someone to advocate: the conditions of "clear and present danger"
must exist; not any old danger, but the specific danger of armed insur-
rections. The "piggybacking" of an inchoate offense upon an advocacy
charge is effectively ruled out.
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If we must have a sedition statute, the Commission provides us with
a model about as safe as human ingenuity can devise. Perhaps it was
because the model provided no scope for the harassment and disruption
of radical political movements that the Justice Department attorneys
who drafted Nixon's criminal code bill disregarded it entirely.
Nixon's criminal code bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 1400
and in the House as H.R. 6046. In his 1973 State of the Union
message, President Nixon called it "a sweeping proposal for reform
based upon a five year study by a non-partisan national commission,"
which was, of course, a falsehood. The bill was modeled upon the
Commission's recommendation to the extent that the chapter headings
and the numbering of the sections largely coincided with the original;
but the substance was all Nixon, Mitchell, and Kleindienst. Section
1103 of S. 1400/H.R. 6046, now re-named "Inciting Overthrow or
Destruction of the Government," indicates how far from the original
is the substance of Nixon's bill.3
From the standpoint of the politician who would like to have at his
disposal an instrument for "getting" the radical opposition, Nixon's sec-
tion 1103 is a model sedition statute. Observe how cleverly it is
worded. The element of intent defined in the preamble of paragraph
(a), for instance, is the intent to bring about the overthrow or destruc-
tion of the government-it need not be by force or violence, or by any
unlawful means. Thus a peaceable anarchist who wishes to call a con-
stitutional convention for the purpose of abolishing the government has
the required intent. Presumably, anyone who commits himself to a
revolutionary slogan or label like "Marxist-Leninist" will be accused of
having the required intent.
The incitement which is the target of the statute, moreover, is the
incitement of conduct which "then or at some future time would facili-
tate" the overthrow of government by force. What sort of conduct
might that be? It need not be violent or unlawful conduct. It need
not be conduct engaged in with revolutionary intent. It need not be
conduct which tends to bring about or enhance the likelihood of violent
revolution. It need only be conduct which at some future time might
make it easier for someone to overthrow the government.
The wording of clause (a)(2) specifies the liability of organizations
or associations. It is not required that the purpose of inciting conduct
which facilitates revolution be the sole purpose of the organization, or
even the chief purpose; it suffices that it is a purpose. It is not required
31. Section 1103 of Nixon's criminal code appears as APPENDIX 3.
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that any revolutionary intent accompany that purpose. Thus the
National Rifle Association (which encourages people to lobby against
gun-control legislation) and the American Civil Liberties Union (which
encourages people to lobby against sedition laws) would likely be liable
under (a)(2).32 If our peaceable anarchist is a member of either
organization, he is now subject to fifteen years in prison and a $100,000
fine. It is not required that he have any knowledge of the purpose
that rendered the organization liable.
Nixon's criminal code bill died in the 93rd Congress. Nixon's Smith
Act survived substantially intact, however, as section 1103 of the
criminal code bill prepared Within the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure during 1974 and
presented to the world on the opening day of the 94th Congress as S.
1-the McClelian-Hruska criminal code bill, bearing the title "Criminal
Justice Reform Act of 1975." 33 The deviations from section 1103 of
Nixon's criminal code are slight, and all but one serve to restrict the
scope of the statute and must therefore be regarded as improvements.
I list them here: (1) The definition of intent in the preamble is
qualified by the addition of the word "forcible." Our hypothetical
peaceable anarchist is no longer liable; the intent required is that of
bringing about the forcible overthrow of government. (2) Persons
wishing to bum down city hall are no longer liable. The reference in
the original to overthrowing local government is omitted in the pream-
ble of the McClellan-Hruska version. (3) In the original, the organ-
izational relationship that renders one liable is "organizes, leads, re-
cruits members for, joins, or remains an active member of." The Mc-
Clellan-Hruska version omits the "joins" and replaces "remains an ac-
tive member of' with "participates as an active member of." (4)
Where the original says "organization," in clause (a) (2), the McClel-
lan-Hruska version says "organization or group." This is the only
change which does not serve to restrict the scope of the statute.
The changes do not give much comfort to the citizen who would like
to retain the option of opposing the establishment with radical rhetoric.
32. I reason that lobbying against effective gun control and lobbying against sedition
statutes both fit the description of conduct which "then or at some future time" "would
facilitate" violent overthrow: the first because the ready availability of guns and
ammunition would certainly make things easier for persons bent upon revolutionary
violence; the second because freedom of speech would certainly make it easier for
revolutionaries to recruit and organize.
33. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Seas., (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. 1]. Section 1103 of S.
1 appears as APPENDix 4.
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The central innovation of the Nixon original-proscribing the incite-
ment of conduct which would facilitate revolution at some future time
-remains intact. This is the language of the sedition statute as it stood
at the opening of the 94th Congress, when S. 1 received the endorse-
ment of such distinguished leaders in the Senate as Birch Bayh of
Indiana, Frank Moss of Utah, Mike Mansfield of Montana, and Hugh
Scott of Pennsylvania.
During the first half of 1975, however, S. 1 underwent some "mark-
ing-up" within the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure and
by August 1, when Congress recessed for the summer, section 1103
had undergone some significant changes.
34
First, the specification of the required intent in the preamble is mod-
ified by dropping the phrase "as speedily as circumstances permit."
The effect of this change, I think, is to broaden rather than restrict
the scope of the statute. Consider the case of a revolutionary who (a)
wishes to bring about the overthrow of the government and (b) be-
lieves that circumstances are now propitious for its overthrow, but (c)
refuses to act because he believes that in the circumstances currently
existing, the new situation created by the overthrow of the government
would be worse than the existing situation. He intends to overthrow
the government, but only at a time when something better will replace
it; it is therefore not his intention to overthrow the government "as
speedily as circumstances permit." He lacks the intent required in the
earlier mentioned versions of section 1103, but he does have the intent
specified in the present mark-up.35
Second, the conduct mentioned in clause (a)(1) is qualified by the
addition of the adjectives "imminent" and "lawless." It is now the
incitement to imminent lawless conduct of a certain type that is the tar-
get of the statute. The change is a great step forward. No longer does
inciting people to write to their representatives in Congress render one
liable.
The phrase "imminent lawless conduct" is presumably drawn from
the language of Brandenburg v. Ohio,3 6 in which a unanimous Supreme
34. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as S. 1, Comm.
Print]. The full text of section 1103 as marked-up, which, to the best of my knowledge,
is the language of S. 1 as it currently stands in the Senate Judiciary Committee, appears
as ArPmNDix 5.
35. For both the point and the example, I am indebted to my colleague, Assistant
Professor Robert G. Keim.
36. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See text accompanying note 41 infra.
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Court struck down Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Statute,87 and said that
Whitney v. California,3 s which had upheld California's Criminal
Syndicalism Act,39 had been "thoroughly discredited by later deci-
sions."4o
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action.... Measured
by this test, Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained. 4'
Presumably, therefore, "imminent lawless conduct" is (a) conduct
which is in violation of the law, and (b) conduct which is very likely
to happen without delay, given the incitement. The scope of the
sedition statute is now greatly restricted.
It should be noted, however, that the section does not require that
the conduct be violent, nor that it threaten the security of the state.
The wording sets no threshold for the seriousness of the offense, and
fails to provide for any proportionality between the penalty due the law-
less conduct and the penalty due the incitement under section 1103.
An example may illustrate the odd consequences of the present
wording.
X is distributing a leaflet-for example, a leaflet calling for the
formation of "a new Marxist-Leninist party." It is not clear that dis-
tributing such a leaflet is conduct which facilitates the forcible over-
throw of government, but a jury might be persuaded that it is and let
us assume such. A police officer orders X to stop distributing the leaf-
lets; but Y, who is a revolutionary, encourages X to defy the police
37. Law of May 7, 1919, 108 Laws of Ohio, pt. 1, 189.
38. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
39. Law of April 30, 1919, ch. 188, [1919] Cal. Stat. 281.
40. 395 U.S. at 447. The Court also relied on the following language from Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961):
mhe mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity
for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent
action and steeling it to such action.
395 U.S. at 448.
The Court distinguished the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute from the constitution-
ally valid Smith Act on the ground that the latter did not prohibit mere advocacy, but
rather proscribed such advocacy where it was "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447 n.2, citing
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
320-24 (1957).
41. 395 U.S. at 447-48.
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order, saying, "Stick up for your first amendment rights!" X does so,
in consequence of which X is arrested for failure to obey a lawful police
order. In S. 1 the offense is an infraction warranting a maximum of
five days imprisonment and/or a $1,000 fine.42 But Y is now guilty
of violating section 1103 as it is presently worded, and becomes liable to
15 years imprisonment and/or a $100,000 fine!
The example points up another difficulty with the present wording.
Suppose that X is either acquitted of the charge of refusal to obey a
lawful police order, or suppose he is convicted, but the conviction is
reversed on appeal on the grounds that the police order was not law-
ful. Is Y still liable under the present wording of section 1103? If
Y has been convicted of violating section 1103 and is in prison when
X's conviction is overturned, is he then released? The given language
provides neither criteria nor procedures for reversing a conviction
under section 1103, or for releasing a prisoner, should the alleged
"imminent lawless conduct' turn out not to be lawless.
The attempt to build the language of Brandenburg v. Ohio into
statutory law generates an enormous technical problem that is not even
recognized in the language before us. There is also a question of
redundancy. Is not the incitement of lawless conduct covered else-
where in S. 1, specifically in chapter 4, Complicity? Section 401,
"Liability of an Accomplice," provides that
a person is criminally liable for an offense based upon the conduct of
another person if . . . acting with the state of mind required for the
commission of the offense, he causes the other -person to engage in con-
duct that would be an offense if engaged in personally by the defendant
or any other person.
With reference to the foregoing example, the language of section 401
would seem to make Y an accomplice in X's refusal to obey a lawful
police order. This, of course, raises a question of consistency: for
under section 401, Y, as an accomplice of X, would be subject to the
same penalties as X.
The third change in the mark-up is the elimination of the phrase
"then or at some future time" from clause (a)(1). It is now incite-
ment to imminent lawless conduct "that would facilitate the forcible
overthrow or destruction" of government for which one becomes liable.
However, the retention of the subjunctive mood of the verb--"would
facilitate"-leaves an ambiguity. Is it conduct which would facilitate
forcible overthrow if certain conditions were fulfilled? I hesitate to
42. S. 1, Comm. Print, supra note 34, § 1862.
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recommend replacing "would facilitate" with "facilitates," of course,
because the whole notion of conduct which facilitates forcible over-
throw is exceedingly broad, indefinite, and conjectural-the improve-
ment would be too slight to be significant.
In another section, a fourth change is made: the mark-up replaces
the phrase "organization or group" in clause (a)(2) with the single
word "group." This perhaps is an attempt to eliminate any inconsis-
tency between sections 1103 and 403, "Liability of an Agent for
Conduct of an Organization." According to section 403(c), it is only
persons exercising supervisory responsibilities who become criminally
liable for offenses committed by the organization. (May one deny a
political party the privileges that a business corporation enjoys by
calling it a "group" rather than an "organization"?)
Finally, the mark-up narrows the required relationship to a group in
clause (a)(2) by eliminating the relation "participates as an active
member in," and creates a new clause (a) (3) to cover that relation-
ship. Under the new clause a member of a group becomes liable only
if he knows that the group has among its purposes the proscribed incite-
ment.43 Also, the grading of the offense is changed to provide that
"knowing membership," i.e., a violation of clause (a)(3), is only a
Class D felony.44
These changes define the sedition statute of S. 1, as formulated on
August 1, 1975.11 Two other proposed amendments should be men-
tioned, by virtue of the distinction of the proposer, Senator Roman L.
-ruska, who has recommended: (1) Adding a definition of "incites"
to the language of S. 1, presumably under section 111, "General Defini-
tions," providing that "incites" shall mean "directly urges, with suc-
cess;" (2) Replacing the verb "would facilitate" in clause (a) (1) with
the expression "calculated to facilitate. '40
The changes would be improvements in that each serves to further
restrict the scope of the statute. The first would mean that an
unsuccessful attempt to incite could not be prosecuted under section
1103, however diabolical the intent of the inciter, however monstrous
the conduct urged. The second would mean that the state of mind of
43. The criterion of knowing membership is in line with Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203 (1961).
44. Imposition of prison sentences is classified according to the class of felony
attributed to the offense. See S. 1, Comm. Print, supra note 34, § 2301.
45. See APm, Nwx 5.
46. Press release of Senator Hruska, Aug. 15, 1975, 121 CoNo. REc. 15957 (daily ed.
Sept. 16, 1975).
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the person incited, as well as the state of mind of the inciter, becomes
relevant to the offense; in effect, two revolutionaries are required for
the offense, instead of just one.
However, throughout all these transformations in the sedition statute,
from the original Nixon version to Senator Hruska's proposed refine-
ments, two elements persist. One is the concept of conduct facilitating
forcible overthrow-an exceedingly broad, indefinite, and conjectural
concept, as already mentioned. (Would the multiplication of 'Marxist-
Leninist" political parties facilitate forcible overthrow, or make it more
difficult? One could easily argue it both ways.) The other is the prin-
ciple of guilt by association: by attributing a purpose to a group we
"get" the leaders. These two elements leave the statute at least as
subject to politically-motivated misuse as the original Smith Act.
One would like to say, "Throw Nixon's Smith Act out of the criminal
code bill," or "Replace it with the National Commission's section 1103,"
except that S. I's section 1103 is so characteristic of the ruthless spirit
that pervades all 753 pages of the bill. When we link the sedition stat-
ute to the "Official Secrets Act" in S. 1,11 the curtailment of the right
of assembly implicit in section 1328 and numerous other sections, 48 the
effective abolition of the insanity plea,49 the provision on entrapment,8 0
the apparent toleration of Watergate-type crimes, 1 the sentences and
the sentencing procedure, 2 mandatory imprisonment and the reintro-
duction of the death penalty,"8 etc.-we may feel inclined to agree with
Professors Countryman and Emerson that S. 1 is indeed "inherently
amendable." 54
Nevertheless, the conscientious citizen must, I think, single out
Nixon's Smith Act as especially noxious and dangerous. I do not think
the point to emphasize is that section 1103 is unconstitutional. The
friends of section 1103 who have been polishing up the wording are
47. S. 1, Comm. Print, supra note 34, §§ 1121-24.
48. Virtually every kind of civil rights, peace & other protest action would be
threatened with severe penalties under [a] series of vaguely drafted infringements on
[the] right of assembly, including the right to demonstrate adjacent to [a] "temporary
residence" where the President may be staying.
National Committee Against Repressive Legislation, Bulletin on S. 1 (Aug., 1975)
(references are to S. 1, Comm. Print, supra note 34, Title 11, Part B, and Title I, §§
1112, 1114-17, 1302, 1311, 1328, 1334).
49. S. 1, Comm. Print, supra note 34, § 552.
50. Id. § 551.
51. Id., "Exercise of Public Authority," §§ 541, 544, 552.
52. Id., Part m, chs. 20-22.
53. Id., chs. 23-24.
54. Emerson & Countryman, Statement on S. 1 (June, 1975).
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satisfied it fits into current first amendment doctrine, and liberals may
be inclined to leave the question of constitutionality to the courts. We
may point out that section 1103 serves no practical function: it no more
protects us from politically-motivated terrorism, assassination, kidnap-
ing, or arson than the present Smith Act does. But the emphasis must
be that we, the people, care for our first amendment rights; we will
not surrender them up, and we will turn out of office any scoundrel
who votes for section 1103 or for S. 1 with section 1103 in it."
55. The alternative criminal code bill recently introduced into the House of Repre-
sentatives eliminates entirely any reference to "Instigating Overthrow or Destruction of
the Government." H.R. 10850, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Kastenmeier, Edwards
& Mikva).
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APPENDI. 1
The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970) (Advocating Overthrow of
Government):
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches
the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroy-
ing the government of the United States or the government of any State,
Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any
political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination
of any officer of any such government; or
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any
such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, dis-
tributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating,
advising, or teaching -the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of
overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force
or violence, or attempts to do so; or
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society,
group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the
overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence;
or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society,
group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof-
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the
United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years
next following his conviction.
If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this
section, each shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment
by the United States or any department or agendy thereof, for the five
years next following his conviction.
As used in this seotion, the terms "organizes" and "organize", with
respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons, include the
recruiting of new members, the forming of new units, and the regroup-
ing or expansion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of such
society, group, or assembly of persons.
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APPENDix 2
FiNAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, § 1103 (1971) (Armed Insurrection):
(1) Engaging in Armed Insurrection. A person is guilty of a Class
BEa] felony if he engages in an armed insurrection with intent to over-
throw, supplant or change the form of the government of the United
States or of a state.
(2) Leading Armed Insurrection. A person is guilty of a Class
A felony if with intent to overthrow, supplant or change the form of
the government of the United States or of a state, he directs or leads
an armed insurrection, or organizes or provides a substantial portion of
the resources of an armed insurrection which is in progress or is
impending or any part of such insurrection involving 100 persons or
more.
(3) Advocating Armed Insurrection. A person is guilty of a Class
C felony if, with intent to induce or otherwise cause others to engage
in armed insurrection in violation of subsection (1), he:
(a) advocates -the desirability or necessity of armed insurrec-
tion under circumstances in which there is substantial likelihood his
advocacy will imminently produce a violation of subsection (1)
or (2); or
(b) organizes an association which engages in the advocacy
prohibited in paragraph (a), or, as an active member of such asso-
ciation, facilitates such advocacy.
(4) Attempt; Conspiracy; Facilitation; Solicitation. tb] A person
shall not be convicted under sections 1001 through 1004:
(a) with respect to subsection (3) (a) unless he engaged in
conduct under circumstances in which there was a substantial like-
lihood that it would imminently produce a violation of subsection
(1) or (2); or
a. The following table represents the scale of maximum penalties according to classifi-
cation of the felony:
Class A felony-30 years, $10,000 fine;
Class B felony-15 years, $10,000 fine;
Class C felony-7 years, $5,000 fine.
NATIONAL COM'N, supra note 27, §§ 3201, 3301.
b. Section 1001, "Criminal Attempt," section 1002, "Criminal Facilitation," section
1003, "Criminal Solicitation," and section 1004, "Criminal Conspiracy," constitute the
principal sections of chapter 10, Offenses of General Applicability, in the Commission's
report. Id.
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(b) with respect to subsection (1), (2), or (3)(b) if his
conduct constituted no more than an attempt or conspiracy to
violate subsection (3) (a) under circumstances in which there was
no substantial likelihood that such attempt or conspiracy would
imminently produce a violation of this section.
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APPENDIx 3
"Nixon's Smith Act," S. 1400, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., § 1103 (1973);
H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1103 (1973) (Inciting Overthrow
or Destruction of the Government):
"(a) OFFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense, if with intent
to bring about the overthrow or destruction of the government of
the United States, or any state or local government, as speedily as
circumstances permit, he:
"(1) incites others to engage in conduct which then or at
some future time would facilitate the overthrow or destruc-
tion by force of that government; or
"(2) organizes, leads, recruits members for, joins, or re-
mains an active member of, an organization which has as a
purpose the incitement described in subsection (a) (1).
"(b) GRADING-An offense described in this section is a Class
C felony. Ed'
c. The following table represents the scale of maximum penalties according to the
classification of the felony:
Class A felony-life imprisonment, $100,000 fine;
Class B felony-30 years, $100,000 fine;
Class C felony-15 years, $100,000 fine;
Class D felony-7 years, $50,000 fine;
Class E felony-3 years, $25,000 fine.
S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 2201, 2301 (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
§§ 2201, 2301 (1973).
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APPEN-DIX 4
"'The Smith Act' in the McClellan-Hruska Criminal Code," S. 1, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 1103 (as originally introduced, Jan., 1975) (Insti-
gating Overthrow or Destruction of the Government):
"(a)OFFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to
bring about the forcible overthrow or destruction of the government of
the United States or of any state as speedily as circumstances permit,
he:
"(1) incites other persons to engage in conduct that then or at
some future time would facilitate the forcible overthrow or destruc-
tion of such government; or
"(2) organizes, leads, recruits members for, or participates as
an active member in, an organization or group that has as a pur-
pose the incitement described in paragraph (1).
"(b) GRADING.-An offense described in this section is a Class
C felony
'Ed]"
d. The scale of sentences provided in S. 1, §§ 2101, 2201, is the same as that in the
"Nixon Bill," except that in S. 1 every felony carries a maximum fine of $100,000. A
different scale is also used depending on whether an individual or an organization is
involved.
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APPENDIX 5
"'The Smith Act' in the McClellan-Hruska Criminal Code," S. 1, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 1103 (as amended within the Subcommittee, Aug.
1, 1975) (Instigating Overthrow or Destruction of the Government):
"(a) OFFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense, if with intent to
bring about the forcible overthrow or destruction of the government
of the United States or of any state ae epeedly a e mstsa pep
he:
"(1) incites other persons to engage in imminent lawless
conduct that thee t & e3 se e time would facilitate the forci-
ble overthrow or destruction of such government;
"(2) organizes, leads, or recruits members fort eP pa tie
paese sea eti v3ehet 43a, i gan 'e er- a group that has as
a purpose the incitement described in paragraph (-) (1); or
"(3) participates as an active member in a group that he
knows has as a purpose the incitement described in paragraph (1).
"(b) GRADING.-An offense described in this section io a Gk1a 0
~41eojy is.
"(1) a Class C felony in the circumstances set forth in sub-
sections (a)(1) and (a)(2);
"(2) a Class D felony in the circumstances set forth in sub-
section (a)(3)."
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